## Tathāgatagarbha Influences in the Three Nature

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Retaining the Abhidharma distinction between the "real" (
) of false projections, the Yogācāras restricted the emptiness of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras to the imagined nature (

Yogācāra model of reality. Besides this Yogācāra type of ontological distinction between real and nominal existence there are also, throughout the Maitreya Works, influences of the

(once even referred to as such in one of the Yogācāra texts of the Maitreya

model of reality contributes to remedying the flaws Yogācāra has in the eyes of Mādhyamikas, namely that a considerable group of sentient beings is completely cut off

Nothingness is never nothing, even less is it a something in the sense of an object; overcome himself as a subject, and that is, when he no longer presents the being as an object.

Looking for that, which truly exists behind the seeming reality of a subject and object, Martin Heidegger proposed his famous "ontological distinction" between the "Sein" and the "Seiende", i.e., the ontic existence of what truly exists (Sein) and the ontological "being" (Seiende) of the cognitively processed data of our daily experience. In Buddhism, the Ābhidharmikas

) of false projections; and in order to retain an ontological distinction (even though in a modified way), the Yogācāras restricted the emptiness of the Prajňāpāramitāsūtras to the imagined nature (

nature from the dependent nature, constitute the Yogācāra model of reality. Parallel to it, two further Mahāyāna models of reality imagined of

interpretation of the Prajñāpārami	tāsūtras.	
responsible for the false projection	of the perceived object (	) and the perceiving subject
defilements		
constituted by these defilemen	ts] must be abandoned.	
Asanga takes issue with a p	pure nominalist position, arguir	ng against Prajñaptivāda, and
	erything is designation only; they." Since for them there is no t	
for their existence. Nāgārjuna contends	, however, that the dependent originati See Burton 1999: 90 & Rospatt 1995:	
4 MAVŢ 122		

|.

designation and reality, the [Prajñaptivādin] should be understood to be the foremost The Sautrāntika ontology of ultimate truth in terms of momentary real particulars ( Mahāyānistic Yogācāra it refers to the inexpressible, bare particulars of the dependent nature. ) in Yogācāra. ("Because of its non-existence, this does not exist either."), consciousness in its aspect of a perceiving subject ( Because of its (i.e., the perceived object's) non-existence, this (i.e., consciousness) inasmuch as it is the perceiving subject — does not exist either. ||. See also Salvini 2015: 29. See also Hacker's (1985: 109) definition of "substance". is much later and not exactly a Yogācāra work, it characterizes the true nature "the particular (i.e., actual reality) of the uncontrived." : "For inasmuch as the true nature of all phenomena, namely what is called the co-emergent, is the "actual reality" of the uncontrived. ..." ( )

|. For a translation of the entire verse and commentary, see

It cognizes; thus it is consciousness. In the absence of a perceived [object], the very act of cognizing does not make sense. Therefore, given the object's non-existence, consciousness as the subject of cognition is non-existent, but not as [the consciousness, which has] objects, sentient beings, a self, and cognitions as its

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It has been argued that the Yogācāra texts of Maitreya negate the real existence of non-dual mind, because in the formulas defining the fourfold Yogācāra practice, which leads to the realization of a state free from perceived and perceiver, "mind-only" (
"cognition-only" (
) is also left behind. False imagining (i.e., "mind-only" as the
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
Based on the non-perception of a [perceived] object, the non-perception of mere

is here not the technical term referring to the Yogācāra tenet

cognition without any object. The formula in

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MAVT, 20 | | |. See also Salvini
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verse, which means that mind refers here to its aspect of being a perceiving subject (
    Having understood that there is no perceived object (
     [referential] objects;
     an object mere cognition (
                        ) is not admissible in the absence of an object of cognition;
To sum up, the original Yogācāra model is centred around a real dependent nature. What is
                                                 || VI.8.
                                    (the root text is in bold letters).
   472f.) for reading the denial of any real or ultimate existence of "mere mind" into these passages.
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Is neither purified nor [not] purified—
This is the defining characteristic of the ultimate.

, because it is also not different

) when defilements cease, and purification occurs; because it is not defiled by nature; , because adventitious defilements are absent [from it]. It should be known that this fivefold mark of nonduality is the

The Madhyamaka dictum of avoiding the extremes of existence and non-existence is reflected dependent. To come back to the original Yogācāra model, if an ultimately existing dependent

can only be avoided by including false imagining within adventitious defilements, of false imagining within adventitious defilements or stains is called for in the second part of the first chapter of the

but not ultimately, because they are the experiential object of worldly knowledge.

) is supramundane wisdom, and being the object (
latter, it is the ultimate object (
and retribution) are not an experiential object of it,
since [any] experiential object of it is an inexpressible general characteristic.

final analysis, the dependent nature is also taken here to belong to the relative truth. The reason

Prajñāpāramitāsūtras' stance that phenomena are empty of such particulars. It should be noted that Vasubandhu responds to a Śrāvaka who would obviously prefer to distinguish the two truths in the context of his Abhidharma system (and thus our original Yogācāra model above).

three nature model becomes compatible with either Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, which allows the relative to be explained in terms of either Sautrāntika or Yogācāra; or else with the Tathāgatagarbha model, which finds a place for the dependent within its adventitious defilements.

Even though Tathāgatagarbha influences in the Yogācāra texts of Maitreya are numerous, the

Even though suchness is undifferentiated in all [sentient beings], In its purified form it is the state of a Tathāgata.

) of him (i.e., the Tathāgata).

used, in the way common to Tathagatagarbha literature, namely as an exocentric compound

Suchness is undifferentiated in all sentient beings, and the Tathagata is by his nature

Tathāgata as their nature.

The way buddha nature is explained here exactly matches its definition as "suchness accompanied by stains"

interprets buddha nature from a Yogācāra perspective.

One problem with the thesis of a consistent Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha synthesis, however, is the teaching of a "cut-off potential" (lit. "those without a family") in

those whose roots of virtue are cut off, those who are without the roots conducive
have buddha nature. Again, we have here an element from the original Yogācāra model, i.e., a
liberation, over against Yogācāra strands that show Tathāgatagarbha and/or Madhyamaka influences. A possible solution to this problem is offered in
Again, the saying: "Icchantikas (lit. 'those with great desire') do not have at all the " is taught with the hidden intention of another time to remove hatred towards the Mahāyāna doctrine, this being the reason why they
-system with a cut-off potential and an ultimately existing dependent nature have in common their incompatibility with the Tathāgatagarbha model of reality. Their respective
in the Yogācāra passages that were subjected to Madhyamaka and, as we will see now, also

Tathāgatagarbha influences. One could further argue, if one's not exist ultimately (just as the dependent nature), the ultimate goodness of an all-pervading even of those with a cut-off potential.

's definition of buddha nature as suchness accompanied by stains ( ). In the final version of the

[Emptiness is] neither defiled nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure. How is it that it is neither defiled nor impure? It is because of the natural luminosity of mind. How is it that it is neither undefiled nor pure? It is because of the adventitious nature of defilements.

in the sense of "forever" instead of

"absolutely", suggesting the reading that even though all sentient beings have the potential to become a Buddha,

RGV I.148 "Its nature being unchangeable, sublime, and pure, suchness is illustrated by a piece of gold." (RGVV

by Asanga as follows: "Although the mind is accompanied by limitless phenomena which are defilements or suffering, it itself does not undergo change, on account of its natural luminosity. This is why it is called suchness, for it will never become something else, any more than sublime gold will." (RGVV 71

How should the differentiation vis-à-vis emptiness be understood?

(MAV I.16a). Thus is the differentiation vis-à-vis it. In what state is it defiled and in what is it pure?

stains, it is defiled, and when [these] stains are abandoned it is pure. If, after being

It should be noted that the terms "defiled" and "pure" which dominate the first part of the , are explicitly equated with "accompanied by stains" and "stainless" — terminology probably imported from the difficult to see how false imagining retains its central position as the existing ground or basis of

in Asanga's commentary on

In the same way, O Sāgaramati, the Bodhisattva knows the natural luminosity of the mind of sentient beings. He [here] again perceives that it is defiled by adventitious

<sup>: &</sup>quot;Of these, the suchness accompanied by stains is the [buddha] element when not freed from the sheath of defilements. It is called buddha nature. Stainless suchness is that [element] called the Tathāgata, that which has the defining characteristic of [having undergone] a fundamental transformation at the level of a Buddha."

adventitious defilements have sprung from false imagining.

To sum up, the presentation of false imagining in the first part of the first chapter is structured around the original Yogācāra model with its dominating Abhidharma background of the said

and/or Tathāgatagarbha influences, the dependent nature becomes the relative truth of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas, or else subsumed under the adventitious stains in the Tathāgatagarbha system. This is fully in line with the general trend of early Mahāyāna to label Abhidharma

accepts original Yogācāra elements such as the cut-off potential only as a teaching with a

Original Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha Elements — Unbalanced Strands of Thought or

offers a solution by claiming that the doctrine of a cut-off potential

to the Tathāgatagarbha teachings, was taught with a purpose in MSA XI.54:

with such and such intent in this and that sūtra. But it is not that the three vehicles

|. First translated and

Sthiramati's sub-commentary classifies the single vehicle theory as a teaching with provisional
As for the explanation of "single vehicle" here, it must be taken to have provisional meaning, because he (i.e., the Buddha) taught it with a [specific] intent, [namely] for the sake of sentient beings. The teaching of three vehicles has definitive meaning.
, though, every sūtra (including definitive ones), has an aim or intent that needs to be identified. In other words, one does not need to
Śrāvakas and the others are not separate from the
one accepts that the final author of the attempted a synthesis of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought, a synthesis that can also be found in the

. This requires a shift from the original Yogācāra model of an
existent duality would describe what is true and false on the level of relative truth only, just as
such a Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha synthesis. It should be noted that in accordance with
Tathāgatagarbha model of reality. The third and fourth lines would then be an explanation of
to accommodate the Yogācāra notion of the three  fortified potentials. While the original Tathāgatagarbha notion of a permanent can fit, for example, into the framework of Nāgārjuna's the Yogācāra interpretation of buddha nature requires the
): "Your body, consisting of buddha qualities (
has been taught by you." (
G -7,7 (
. This does Thl t

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with the Tathāgatagarbha theory. It should be noted that this restriction of the dependent to the relative truth also enables the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

A way into a Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha synthesis can be also found in the

relative and ultimate truths. Still, the two truths system finds a correspondence in the distinction


definitions are as follows:

As to the defining characteristics of


differentiation between a perceived object and a perceiving subject, an expressed object and expression.

there and attached ePs corresponden EK

In other words, it partakes of a higher degree of reality, just as in the . This is also clear from the definition of a perceived object and perceiving subject, and of an expressed object and a corresponding expression, is negated but false imagining is not. In the final analysis, it must be included within
is evident, as can be gathered from Vasubandhu's final summary:
objects of comparison], not [their] substance, was taught as being analogous [to the
. The additions in brackets are in accordance with Vasubandhu's commentary (see
DhDhVV 706-8:



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